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Cooperation driven by success-driven group formation
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In the traditional setup of public goods game all players are involved in every available groups and the mu-
tual benefit is shared among competing cooperator and defector strategies. But in real life situations the group
formation of players could be more sophisticated because not all players are attractive enough for others to par-
ticipate in a joint venture. What if only those players can initiate a group formation and establish a game who
are successful enough to the neighbors? To elaborate this idea we employ a modified protocol and demonstrate
that a carefully chosen threshold to establish joint venture could efficiently improve the cooperation level even if
the synergy factor would suggest a full defector state otherwise. The microscopic mechanism which is respon-
sible for this effect is based on the asymmetric consequences of competing strategies: while the success of a
cooperator provides a long-time well-being for the neighborhood, the temporary advantage of defection cannot
be maintained if the protocol is based on the success of leaders.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Cc
I. INTRODUCTION
Social dilemmas are frequently captured within the frame-
work of public goods game where two basic strategies com-
pete: while cooperators contribute to the common pool, de-
fectors do not, but only enjoy the benefit of mutual efforts [1].
Not surprisingly, if a player’s goal is to reach a better individ-
ual position by following a more successful strategy then the
system can easily be trapped into the so-called “tragedy of the
common state” where full defection forces a global minimum
for all [2, 3]. Nevertheless, it is our everyday life experience
that cooperation embraces us [4], which is a clear indication
that a fundamental detail is ignored by our basic approach.
Several adequate suggestions have been made in the last
decade which try to address the conflict of experiment and
theory [5–21]. One of these research directions assumed that
more sophisticated strategies should be used, which go be-
yond the simplest unconditional cooperator and defector be-
haviors [22, 23]. In case of conditional cooperation, for in-
stance, we may assume that some players cooperate only if
a certain portion of group members are willing to cooperate
[24, 25]. Or, from a different viewpoint, some players are
tolerant toward a minimal level of defection and change atti-
tude only if the number of defectors exceeds a threshold level
[26, 27]. But we can also quote the simplest approach which
applies a similar unconditional strategy, loner, who prefers not
to participate in the joint venture, but choose a moderate fixed
income [28, 29].
A further conceptually different research avenue warrants
that players are not randomly mixed, as it is supposed in the
early works, but instead we should consider a sort of inter-
action graph which determines the possible partners of ev-
ery individual [30]. The most important consequences of this
concept are limited and permanent interactions which estab-
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lish the chance for the so-called network reciprocity mech-
anism to work [31, 32]. The latter is considered as one of
the fundamental ways how to escape the trap raised in the
introductory paragraph [33]. Let us stress that there are sev-
eral other interesting possibilities, such as the heterogeneity of
players [34, 35], or special character of interaction topology
[31, 36, 37], which could also be helpful to support coopera-
tor strategy. For further details we refer a recent review of this
game where comprehensive overview can be found about our
current understanding [38].
We should note that most of the mentioned works assume a
certain symmetry on how the interaction graph is used. More
precisely, a focal player, who organizes a game with actual
neighbors, also participates in the games organized by nearest
neighbors. In this way a player is always involved in several
independent games which are determined by the interaction
graph. This simple assumption, however, ignores a signifi-
cant real-life experience. Namely, to participate in a joint ven-
ture is not always attractive to every potential group members.
Consequently, players are reluctant to join if an unsuccessful
player organizes a game but they are more enthusiastic when a
successful player, having high payoff, is announcing a game.
The simplest way to consider this attitude is if we introduce a
threshold level of payoff which should be reached by all play-
ers who want to organize a game. Those who fail to fulfill
this criterion cannot establish a group hence cannot organize
a game, but can only participate in the games of others, which
remains the only way to collect some payoff for them.
It is important to emphasize that the proposed protocol is
“strategy-neutral”, i.e., there is no direct support of cooperator
strategy. When the concept of reputation is used, for instance,
then the latter criterion is not fulfilled because the applied dy-
namics gives a direct advantage for those who cooperate and
behave positively toward others [39]. Interestingly, similar
claim can also be raised when punishment (of defectors) or
reward (of cooperators) are used because in these cases we
always assume a sort of cognitive skill from players to iden-
tify others’ strategies [40–42]. In our present model we do
not assume such an extra ability about players, but only sup-
2pose that they recognize the resulting payoff of their partners.
Since both cooperator and defector strategy may gain individ-
ual success, the consequence of the proposed protocol is far
from trivial. In the next section we describe the employed
evolutionary game, whereas Section III is devoted to the pre-
sentation of our observations. Finally in the last section we
summarize and discuss their implications.
II. MODEL DEFINITION
The public goods game is staged on a square lattice where
players can cooperate or defect. According to the applied in-
teraction topology every player may participate in N = 5 dif-
ferent games which is organized by the focal individual of a
von Neuman neighborhood and four nearest neighbors. As a
consequence, the individual payoff of player i is calculated as
Πi =
∑
j Π
j
i , where Π
j
i is the income of i from the game
which is organized by the neighboring player j. It is a fun-
damental point, however, that a player j can organize a game
only if Πj collected in the previous round exceeds a critical
threshold H . If it is fulfilled then all neighboring cooperator
players contribute c = 1 to the public good which is multi-
plied by a synergy factor r. After this the enhanced amount
is shared equally among all group members no matter if they
contributed or not. In other words, the success in collecting
high payoff in the last round gives a merit to distinguished
players to organize a game in the subsequent round. In this
way the status of all players can be characterized by a four-
state model. In particular, Cl denotes the status of those coop-
erators who were unsuccessful in the last round therefore their
merit is “low” hence they can only contribute to the games
organized by their neighbors. Ch denotes “high-merit” coop-
erators who were successful enough to collect the requested
payoff in the last round therefore they can also organize their
own game. Similarly, unsuccessful defectors are denoted by
Dl whose only chance to collect payoff is to participate in the
neighbors’ games. Finally, Dh marks the high-merit defectors
who are able to organize their own games which offers them
an extra way to exploit their neighbors.
Initially each player on site x is designated either as a coop-
erator or as a defector, and meanwhile is endowed with “low”
or “high” merit with equal probability. According to an el-
ementary Monte Carlo step a player x is selected randomly
whose Πx payoff is calculated in the way we described in the
previous paragraph. Let us stress again that the resulting Πx
payoff depends not only on the strategies of neighbors but also
on their merit values. Next, one of the four nearest neighbors
of player x is chosen randomly, and its location is denoted by
y. Player y also acquires its payoff Πy as previously described
for player x. Finally, player x imitates the strategy of player y
with the probability
s(Πx,Πy) =
1
1 + exp[(Πx −Πy)/K]
, (1)
where K determines the level of uncertainty by strategy adop-
tions [43]. Without the loss of generality we set K = 0.5, im-
plying that better performing players are almost imitated, but
it is not impossible to adopt the strategy of a player perform-
ing worse. Each full Monte Carlo step (MCS) involves that
all players having a chance to adopt a strategy from one of
their neighbors once on average. Beside strategy adoption the
merit of players are also updated. Similarly to strategy update
here we also considered the possibility of error in judgment or
player’s deception. Accordingly the merit of a player x is set
to be “high” with probability
m(Πx) =
1
1 + exp[(H −Πx)/K]
, (2)
otherwise its merit is selected to be “low”. For simplicity we
used the same level of uncertainty of merit selection, but the
extension toward more general model with different noise lev-
els is possible. Note that the stochastic character of merit’s
update has a similar fundamental role as it has for strategy up-
date. Namely, it allows the system to avoid a frozen trapped
state hence revealing the leading cooperator supporting mech-
anism.
Depending on the applied threshold value H and the syn-
ergy factor r the linear system size was varied from L =
400 − 6000 in order to avoid finite size effects. The neces-
sary time to reach the stationary state is varied from 5 · 103
to 105 MCSs. Evidently, the evolution is halted if one of the
competing strategies extinct or all high-merit players die out.
In the latter case, when only low-merit players are present,
groups are not formed hence there is no actual interaction be-
tween players and the evolution between defectors and coop-
erators becomes a neutral drift similar to the case of voter-
model dynamics [44, 45]. We have repeated our independent
runs 10-1000 times to reach the requested accuracy of pre-
sented data.
III. RESULTS
First we illustrate how the application of success-driven
group formation influences the cooperation level at a fixed
value of synergy factor. In Figure 1 we have chosen two
representative r values. In the top panel we use r = 3.5
which would result in a full defector state in the traditional
model where all possible groups are formed [46]. As the top
panel shows, applying small threshold value has no particu-
lar role on the cooperation level: the system still evolves into
a full defector state, where the only consequence is the rel-
ative fraction of Dh and Dl players characterizing the state
when the last cooperator dies out. While Dh and Dl states are
represented almost with equal weights for very small H val-
ues, the fraction of Dh increases monotonously as we increase
the threshold level. When H exceeds the critical Hc = 2.51
value then a qualitatively new solution emerges during the
evolution in which cooperators and defectors coexist. Here
the application of success-driven group formation has a posi-
tive impact on the cooperation level because significantly high
threshold value can only be reached in the vicinity of cooper-
ator players. This selection mechanism could be so powerful
that the fraction of cooperators increases gradually by increas-
ing H and the system can evolve to a full cooperator state if
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Stationary fractions of the four possible states
of players in dependence on the threshold value H as obtained for
r = 3.5 (in Fig.1(a)) and for r = 4.5 (in Fig.1(b)). Cooperators
(defectors) with high and low merit are denoted by Ch and Cl (Dh
and Dl) respectively. The application of low H values has no par-
ticular impact on the strategy evolution: only defectors survive at
low r value, while cooperators and defectors coexist at high r value.
If we increase the threshold value then cooperators become domi-
nant gradually and the system reaches the full-cooperator state. In-
creasing the H value further the system is trapped into a frozen state
where both high-merit strategies extinct at an early stage of evolu-
tion. The border of this critical H value is marked by thin dashed-line
in both panels. In the bottom panel arrow marks the critical H value
where success-driven group formation already improves the cooper-
ation level. The error bars are comparable to the width of curves.
H > 5.701. Interestingly, the full-cooperator state is bordered
by a so-called “frozen” state if the threshold level is too high.
In the latter case all initially high-merit players die out soon
because they unable to maintain the requested high payoff.
As a result, only low-merit cooperators and low-merit defec-
tors remain who are actually unable to collect payoff because
there are no properly organized games. In this case Eq. 1 dic-
tates a random strategy update which is conceptually similar
to a neutral drift of voter-model [44]. Here both full C and
full D states are possible destinations via a logarithmically
slow coarsening [45] where the probability to terminate to the
mentioned states depends on the initial fractions of strategies.
If r is high enough, shown in Fig. 1(b), cooperators coexist
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Stationary fractions of the four possible states
of players in dependence on synergy factor r for low (H = 1.5 in
Fig.2(a)) and high threshold value (H = 3.8 in Fig.2(b)). For low
H value the system behavior is similar to the classical model where
higher r always results in higher fraction of cooperators. Interest-
ingly, increasing r does not necessarily elevate the cooperation level
for high H .
with defectors in the traditional model due to the well-known
network reciprocity mechanism [46]. Similarly to the previ-
ously discussed case low H values have no particular role on
the stationary state: if H < Hc = 4.52 for the mentioned r
value then the sum of cooperator players equals to the cooper-
ation level that can be obtained in the traditional model where
all possible group formations are considered. Above this crit-
ical value, marked by an arrow in Fig. 1(b), the application of
success-driven group forming protocol helps to support coop-
erator strategy. The full-cooperator state can also be reached if
the appliedH exceeds the H = 7.52 critical value. This phase
is bordered by the earlier mentioned frozen region where it is
more likely that a finite-size system evolves to a low-merit
state than to reach the defector-free destination.
Our next figure illustrates the impact of increasing synergy
factor r when the threshold value is fixed. The top panel of
Fig. 2 shows a representative plot for a low threshold level.
Here the application of success-driven group formation pro-
tocol has no particular influence on the cooperation level.
Namely, if the synergy factor is too low then an initially ran-
dom system always terminates into a full defector state leav-
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Time evolution of random initial state as obtained for r = 3.5 and H = 5 on a square lattice using L = 100 system
size. Cooperators with high merit are marked by dark blue (dark grey), whereas the same strategy with low merit is denoted by light blue
(light grey). Defectors with low merit are marked by red (middle grey) and defectors with high merit are denoted by a green color (dotted
lighted grey), as indicated by the legend on the top. Snapshots were taken at 10, 200, 400, and 800 MCSs. Because of the high threshold
value almost all players become in a low-merit state, shown in panel (a), and only a tiny seed of cooperator domains is capable to collect the
necessary high payoff to enjoy high-merit state. Due to a neutral drift between low-merit strategies a slow coarsening starts, as illustrated
in panel (b). Importantly, high-merit cooperator domains grow undisturbed way deep in low-merit domains which offers a protecting shield
against defectors. Even if a defector becomes a neighbor of a high-merit cooperator domain, as shown in panel (c), the resulting high payoff and
the related high merit offer just a temporary advantage to Dh player: when a neighboring cooperator follows the victor then the latter’s payoff,
hence merit, falls down and the mentioned defector will be unable to utilize cooperator neighbors efficiently anymore. In the stationary state,
which is shown in panel (d), the majority of players remain in a cooperator status and just a small portion of players could enjoy temporarily
the benefit of defector strategy. Note that the system would be in full-defector state in the absence of success-driven group formation protocol
for this low value of synergy factor. Further details are given in the main text.
ing a mixture of Dl and Dh players. One may claim that
the synergy factor is too small for defectors to keep the high-
merit state hence Dh players should extinct, too. Indeed, they
can only collect high payoff and gain high merit only at the
early state of evolution when cooperators are present. When
the last cooperator dies out the simulation is halted, hence
the fraction of Dh players reflects this stage of the evolu-
tion. By increasing r further the cooperation level will rise
monotonously, which is a pure consequence of network reci-
procity. It is an interesting effect, however, that defectors with
high merit are less viable than low-merit defectors. It is be-
cause that the latter players can partly enjoy the neighboring
cooperator-organized games but these defectors are unable to
collect so high payoff which allow them to establish their own
games. This phenomenon indicates implicitly how success-
driven group forming could be a powerful tool because it al-
lows defectors to be successful just for a short period.
Interestingly, the application of higher threshold values for
group-formation protocol can produce a more exotic, non-
monotonous r-dependence. This is illustrated in the bottom
panel of Fig. 2. Similarly to the previously discussed case,
too small synergy factor is unable to maintain cooperation and
the evolution will terminate onto a full-defector state. Never-
theless, the positive effect of success-based selection can be
detected already at much smaller r values. In particular, the
system can evolve into a cooperator dominated state at no-
ticeably low r = 2.59 synergy factor, which is much lower
than rc = 3.74 where the coexistence of C and D strategies
starts in the traditional model. This improvement is a beautiful
manifestation of the efficient selection mechanism of success-
driven group formation. More precisely, the combination of
a low synergy factor r and a relatively high threshold value
provide a special demand which can only be fulfilled by co-
operator players who are surrounded by similarly cooperator
neighbors. Lonely defectors may gain the requested high pay-
off temporarily, but the exploitation of their neighbors will
weaken the cheated cooperator players who are unable to or-
ganize their own games anymore. As a consequence, the men-
tioned defectors cannot collect payoff from external groups
anymore, hence their fitness will not be competitive to players
in a C domain.
The above described argument suggests that if we increase
r then we may manipulate the system in an undesired way be-
cause higher synergy factor makes possible for different types
of players to reach the desirably high payoff. The bottom
panel of Fig. 2 confirms this conclusion. Namely, by increas-
ing r the cooperation level decreases drastically because de-
fectors can also collect the requested payoff in the vicinity of
cooperators. As a straightforward consequence, increasing r
would further weaken the highly selected position of Ch play-
ers hence we would expect lower cooperation level. But here,
as we approach the critical rc = 3.74 value, another mecha-
nism starts working because clustering cooperators can sup-
port each other via network reciprocity which will elevate the
cooperation level in a similar fashion as we observed in the
top panel of Fig. 2.
To gain a deeper insight about the microscopic mechanism
that is responsible for the cooperator supporting group for-
mation we present series of snapshots of the evolution at pa-
rameter values where this selection is functioning clearly. In
5Figure 3 the simulation was started from a completely ran-
dom initial state (not shown here) where all available states of
players are present with equal weights. Because of the strict
demands almost every players become in low-merit state af-
ter a short period, as it is illustrated in panel (a). Here only
those cooperators can fulfill the high threshold of payoff who
are surrounded by akin cooperator players (they are marked
by dark blue) in the snapshots. This is a crucial difference
between C and D strategies because defectors’ high payoff
can only be reached on the expense of neighbors who be-
come weak (exploited) and are unable to fulfill the demand
of high threshold. Consequently, they are unable to organize
their own game which also weakens indirectly the position of
neighboring defectors. As panel (a) illustrates, expect of the
small cooperator islands all the other players are trapped into
a low-merit state independently of they are cooperators or de-
fectors. In the absence of high-merit players a neutral drift
starts evolving between the competing C and D strategies be-
cause none of them can collect actual payoff. Interestingly,
the resulting coarsening of low-merit C and D domains also
supports the growth of high-merit Ch domains which can ex-
pand gradually in the growing matrix of Cl players.
It is crucial to note that the propagation of Ch state in a
Cl domain is possible because of the stochastic character of
merit’s update protocol defined by Eq. 2. More precisely,
the applied noise paves the path for a biased interface mo-
tion between Ch and Cl domains. Here, it is more likely
that a Cl player switches to Ch state at the border of their
domains than the reversed process because the vicinity of a
high-merit neighbor can provide already a reasonable payoff
for Cl players. However, in case of deterministic player qual-
ification process, or in other words in the absence of noise
in merit selection, the interface separating Ch and Cl players
would be frozen and the whole cooperator supporting effect
would be less effective. In the latter case, on the one hand, the
previously described neutral drift between C and D strategies
would result in an all C system for high H values. On the
other hand, the resulting state can hardly be considered as co-
operating population because it dominantly contains Cl play-
ers who cannot organize games and in the absence of common
pools they cannot properly contribute.
Turning back to the noisy merit update protocol, it may also
happen that a defector meets the border of a Ch domain. The
vicinity of active cooperators offers a chance for defectors to
reach the high merit status as it is shown in panel (c) of Fig. 3.
Their success, however, is just a short term victory because it
already involves the shade of their failure. First, neighboring
cooperators, who provide the success of their defector fall into
a low-merit status hence they are unable to organize their own
games anymore. Second, they imitate the strategy of their
more successful neighbor which lessens further the income
of the focal defector who becomes completely vulnerable. As
a result, defectors can frequently rise in the stationary state
but they fall immediately which offers a narrow time window
of viability to them in the sea of cooperators. A representative
snapshot of the emerging morphology is shown in panel (d) of
Fig. 3.
From the above described microscopic mechanism we can
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Full r − H phase diagram for public goods
game when success-driven group formation is applied. Solid red line
denotes continuous phase transition, while dashed blue line marks
discontinuous phase transition. D (C) denotes full defector (cooper-
ator) phase while D+C marks the phase where competing strategies
coexist. (D+C)i denotes a phase where the application of success-
driven group organization results in a higher cooperation level com-
paring to the traditional model. Grey dotted line denotes the border
of fixed F state where high-ranking players extinct at an early stage
of evolution.
conclude that a delicate combination of r and H parameters
is necessary to observe the positive impact of success-driven
group formation protocol. To explore the complete behavior
of our model we present the full r−H phase diagram in Fig. 4.
This diagram confirms our expectation, namely, if H is low
then the behavior of present model practically agrees with the
behavior of the traditional spatial model. Namely, the system
always evolves to a full D state for low r while the coexis-
tence of competing strategies can be observed above a critical
rc = 3.74 value of synergy factor, which is a straightforward
consequence of network reciprocity. The latter phase is de-
noted by D + C in the diagram. It is also in agreement with
our expectation that too large H value transfers the model into
an uninteresting situation where all high-merit players extinct
at a very early stage of the evolution and the remaining low-
merit strategies “compete” without proper interaction (they
both collect zero payoff). At intermediate H and r values,
however, we can witness how effectively the group leader se-
lection mechanism supports cooperator strategy. We have de-
noted by “improved” (D + C)i the phase where cooperators
and defectors coexist but the average level of cooperation ex-
ceeds the corresponding level of traditional model when using
the same r value. This kind of support could be so power-
ful that defectors extinct and we can reach a fully cooperator
phase, marked by C in the diagram.
We would like to emphasize that the positive impact of
success-driven group formation protocol is not restricted to
the applied topology, but remains valid if we use less regu-
lar interaction graphs. To illustrate it we present results for
stationary states obtained on a random graph where uniform
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Stationary fractions of the four possible states
of players in dependence on threshold value H as obtained for r =
3.5 on random graph where 〈k〉 = 4 uniform degree distribution was
applied. If threshold H is increased above a critical value, marked by
an arrow, then success-driven group formation mechanism is capable
to elevate the cooperation level significantly. Above a critical value
of H , denoted by a dashed line, the demand towards group organizers
becomes so high that nobody can fulfill it and the system is trapped
into a state of low-merit players.
degree distribution is preserved and every node has 〈k〉 = 4
neighbors [47]. This modification allows us to introduce only
randomness of links without involving additional disturbing
effects. As Figure 5 shows the cooperation level starts rais-
ing if threshold exceeds Hc = 0.79 value which is marked by
an arrow in the plot. By increasing H further the cooperator
supporting selection mechanism becomes more effective and
the sum of cooperator player grows monotonously. This pos-
itive impact terminates only if H becomes too high because
H > 4.32 is proved to be inaccessible demand for groups or-
ganizers at this value of r. Here, as we have already discussed
for square lattice topology, the initial high-merit players die
out immediately after the evolution is launched and only low-
merit players remain.
The results summarized in Fig. 5 supports our argument
that the interaction topology has second order importance be-
cause the proposed selection mechanism will always amplify
the positive consequence of network reciprocity. The only
crucial criterion is to have stable partners during the strategy
evolution. We can easily confirm this argument indirectly if
we consider the well-mixed version of the proposed model.
In the latter case network reciprocity cannot function because
players have no limited and stable connections.
To check the differences we can also consider the case of
unstructured population and solve the related replicator equa-
tions numerically. Details of this calculation are given in the
Appendix while the main results are summarized in Fig. 6. As
the top two panels illustrate, there are two significantly dif-
ferent trajectories if we launch the evolution from a random
initial state where all states are present with equal weights. If
the applied threshold level is low, shown in panel (a), then all
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Success-driven group formation in well-mixed
populations. Top panels show how the fractions of players’ state
change when the system evolves from a random initial state for dif-
ferent threshold values of H . If H is low, shown in panel (a), then
all cooperators die out and the system terminates into a full-defector
state. If H is high enough, shown in panel (b), then all high-merit
players extinct independently of their strategies and only low-merit
players remain who are unable to organize groups and play public
goods game. Threshold values are H = 2.95 and 3.0 respectively,
while r = 4.0 for both cases. Panel (c) depicts the critical value of
H in dependence on synergy factor which is the border line of the
above mentioned two possible trajectories.
cooperators will die out no matter if they have high or low ini-
tial merit. If H is above a critical Hc value then another two
states extinct. Namely, bothCh andDh players die out and the
system is trapped in a state where only low-merit players are
present hence there is no proper interaction between compet-
ing strategies. Naturally, the actual value of Hc where these
trajectories change depends on the value of synergy factor r,
as it is summarized in panel (c). The latter plot suggests that
in case of harsh conditions, when r is low, a higher thresh-
old value is necessary to avoid the full-D state because low
r values offer an obvious advantage for defectors, which will
provide a fast extinction of cooperators. This time course can
be avoided only if H is so high that it provides an unsolvable
barrier to defectors as well, hence they cannot organize their
groups and cannot collect payoff anymore. Nevertheless, the
presented results support our expectation, namely, the appli-
cation of success-driven group formation protocol can support
cooperation actively only in structured populations where it
provides an elegant way to amplify network reciprocity.
7IV. DISCUSSION
It is a widespread observation that people are not always en-
thusiastic to participate in a joint venture because the one who
establishes it could have a decisive role in its success. In par-
ticular, if the one who organizes the game is unsuccessful in
general then neighbors are reluctant to join, while a successful
actor is always an attractive target of investments. Motivated
by these observations we proposed a minimal model where
only those players can establish a group and announce a pub-
lic goods game whose previous payoff exceeds a threshold
level. Otherwise, a player who fails to fulfill this criterion can
only participate in other’s game.
Our results demonstrated that the proposed protocol can
support cooperation in structured populations effectively, be-
cause individual success can only be maintained if a player
tries to cooperate with its neighbors, while a defector’s suc-
cess could only be short-lived because it is based on the ex-
ploitation of others. In this way success, which is principally
a strategy-neutral demand and cannot be told its origin in ad-
vance, could be a powerful selection mechanism which recon-
ciles individual and collective interests.
In other words, success serves as an individual reputation
that can inform neighbors how to interact with other poten-
tial partners. In contrast to the traditional assumption about
reputation, however, we do not suppose a priori a positive
behavior about a player when high-reputation is considered
[39, 48, 49]. Still, success can only work permanently for
those players who are responsible to their neighborhood’s suc-
cess as well. This observation fits nicely to more general find-
ings where individual success was a key factor of strategy up-
date [50–53].
Interestingly, higher demand for success is proved to be
more effective selection criterion for a higher cooperation
level. This observation conceptually fits to some previous
findings when harsh environment, which is modeled by less
attractive payoff parameters of the actual social game, resulted
in higher cooperation level in the population [54, 55]. In our
present case the explanation of this seemingly counterintuitive
behavior is that defectors can only reach a limited level of suc-
cess because really high payoff can only be gained with the
help of successful associates.
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Appendix
In the following we summarize the replicator equations [56]
and related payoff values for well-mixed population when
success-driven group formation protocol is applied. Here
the fraction of Dl, Dh, Cl, and Ch players are denoted by
x
Dl
, x
Dh
, x
Cl
, and x
Ch
respectively. Because of their total
numbers are fixed their fractions fulfill the equation x
Dl
+
x
Dh
+ x
Cl
+ x
Ch
= 1. The related equations which describe
the rates of changes of the strategies are as follows:
x˙
Ch
= x
Ch
(Π
Ch
−Πh) + xClm(ΠCl )− xCh [1−m(ΠCh )]
x˙
Cl
= x
Cl
(Π
Cl
−Πl) + xCh [1−m(ΠCh )]− xClm(ΠCl )
x˙
Dl
= x
Dl
(Π
Dl
−Πl) + xDh [1−m(ΠDh )]− xDlm(ΠDl ).
Here dots denote the derivatives with respect to time t and
m(z) is the well-known Fermi-function which dictates how
individual merit evolves according to Eq. 2. The first term
in the equations characterizes the rate of changes of strate-
gies by strategy updating, and the second and third terms in
the equations characterize the rate of changes of strategies by
merit updating. The averaged payoff Πh in the subpopulation
with the high merit value and the averaged payoff Πl in the
subpopulation with the low merit value are respectively given
by
Πh = (xChΠCh + xDhΠDh )/(xCh + xDh ) , (3)
and
Πl = (xClΠCl + xDlΠDl )/(xCl + xDl ) , (4)
where the average payoff for each subset of players are:
Π
Ch
=
∑
i+j+k+n=N−1
(N − 1)!
i!j!k!n!
xi
Cl
xj
Ch
xk
Dl
xn
Dh
(
r(i + j + 1)
N
− 1
)
+
∑
i+j+k+n=N−2
(N − 2)!
i!j!k!n!
(N − 1)x
Ch
xi
Cl
xj
Ch
xk
Dl
xn
Dh
(
r(i + j + 2)
N
− 1
)
+
∑
i+j+k+n=N−2
(N − 2)!
i!j!k!n!
(N − 1)x
Dh
xi
Cl
xj
Ch
xk
Dl
xn
Dh
(
r(i + j + 1)
N
− 1
)
Π
Cl
=
∑
i+j+k+n=N−2
(N − 2)!
i!j!k!n!
(N − 1)x
Ch
xi
Cl
xj
Ch
xk
Dl
xn
Dh
(
r(i + j + 2)
N
− 1
)
+
∑
i+j+k+n=N−2
(N − 2)!
i!j!k!n!
(N − 1)x
Dh
xi
Cl
xj
Ch
xk
Dl
xn
Dh
(
r(i + j + 1)
N
− 1
)
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Dh
=
∑
i+j+k+n=N−1
(N − 1)!
i!j!k!n!
xi
Cl
xj
Ch
xk
Dl
xn
Dh
r(i + j)
N
+
∑
i+j+k+n=N−2
(N − 2)!
i!j!k!n!
(N − 1)x
Ch
xi
Cl
xj
Ch
xk
Dl
xn
Dh
r(i + j + 1)
N
+
∑
i+j+k+n=N−2
(N − 2)!
i!j!k!n!
(N − 1)x
Dh
xi
Cl
xj
Ch
xk
Dl
xn
Dh
r(i + j)
N
Π
Dl
=
∑
i+j+k+n=N−2
(N − 2)!
i!j!k!n!
(N − 1)x
Ch
xi
Cl
xj
Ch
xk
Dl
xn
Dh
r(i + j + 1)
N
+
∑
i+j+k+n=N−2
(N − 2)!
i!j!k!n!
(N − 1)x
Dh
xi
Cl
xj
Ch
xk
Dl
xn
Dh
r(i + j)
N
(5)
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